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BLD-271

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-1466
___________
KRISHNA MOTE,
Appellant
v.

CAPTAIN JAMES W. MURTIN; DETECTIVE JACK GILL;
TROOPER BARRY BRINSER; TROOPER PETER SALERNO;
TROOPER CRAIG RODRIGUES; TROOPER MATTHEW TREDOR;
TROOPER GREGORY DALEY; TROOPER POWELL; TROOPER YOWN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00092)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
on August 6, 2020
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 25, 2020)
____________________________________

___________
OPINION *
___________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Krishna Mote, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the
District Court’s order dismissing his complaint. Because the appeal presents no substantial
question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
On January 17, 2020, Mote, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a civil rights lawsuit claiming that on January 23, 2007, the defendants used excessive force against him, leaving him
with permanent physical and mental injuries. The District Court screened the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Approving and adopting a magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, the District Court dismissed Mote’s complaint for failure to
state a claim. Mote timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s dismissal of Mote’s complaint. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We conclude that the District Court was correct to dismiss the
complaint because Mote’s claims are time barred. 1 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is
an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and is subject to waiver, see Chainey v. Street,

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
We therefore do not need to reach the District Court’s alternative rationale, based on
issue preclusion, for dismissing Mote’s complaint.
2

523 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008), but untimeliness may justify sua sponte dismissal where
“it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the
court has provided the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.” Vasquez
Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d
636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214–15 (2007) (explaining
that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a prisoner complaint that is time barred).
Upon review of Mote’s complaint, we are satisfied that it presents no meritorious tolling
issues. The statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is
two years. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). The limitations period begins
to run “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action
is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
Mote does not disagree that the limitations period began on January 23, 2007, which is the
date of the underlying incident. Rather, he argues that the limitations period was somehow
tolled when his previous lawsuit, which raised the same claims, was dismissed. But such
an event is not a basis for tolling the limitations period. While under Pennsylvania law,
filing a complaint tolls the statute of limitations, see Kach, 589 F.3d at 639 (explaining that
where it would not frustrate the federal interest underpinning § 1983, we borrow the forum
state’s tolling principles); Zoller v. Highland Country Club, 156 A.2d 599, 600–01 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1959), it does not extend the limitations period past the entry of a valid order or
judgment, see Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 218 A.2d 333, 335 (Pa. 1966).
To the extent Mote argues that his mental illness is a basis for equitable tolling, that
argument is unavailing. See Seto v. Willits, 638 A.2d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
3

(noting that Pennsylvania law does not allow for the tolling of a statute of limitations due
to mental incapacity); see also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that we have permitted federal equitable tolling for mental disability only where “the
plaintiff’s mental incompetence motivated, to some degree, the injury that he sought to
remedy”). As is clear from the face of Mote’s complaint, there are no other discernible
grounds for excusing his untimeliness. See Vasquez Arroyo, 589 F.3d at 1097. 2
Finally, the District Court did not err when it declined to grant Mote leave to amend his
complaint. Because Mote cannot change the fact that his claims are time barred, any
amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002).
For the above reasons, will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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Additionally, Mote was provided with notice and an opportunity to respond by way of
the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, which raised the statute of limitations
issue, and to which Mote filed objections. See Report & Recommendation 10–13, D.C.
Dkt. No. 8; Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation satisfied a district court’s obligation to provide
notice prior to the sua sponte imposition of sanctions); United States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d
155, 168 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc) (determining that a district court gave adequate notice
prior to sua sponte dismissal when it entered an order that allowed both parties several
weeks to brief the issue of untimeliness).
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